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ABSTRACT
My thesis is that the process of siting energy facilities can
be improved by legislative action. The legislation proposed is aimed at
changing both the method and the spirit of determining the location of new
energy plants.
The procedures most prevalent today almost always lead to court
action and protracted appeals which result in long delays and escalating
costs. To avoid this syndrome, the legislation emphasizes local options,
coordination of governmental regulation, community involvement to achieve
consensus, and direct compensation to residents as well as localities ad-
versely affected by a proposed energy facility.
The Act creates the Energy Facility Siting Agency (EFSA) and gives
it primary regulatory power over location, design and operation of non-
nuclear energy facilities. Procedures are outlined for the submission of
requests by energy companies interested in building a specific facility
and localities wishing to locate the facility within their jurisdiction.
A framework is created for the provision of compensation through negoti-
ations.
The legislation is both a mechanism for promoting rationality and
efficiency in the siting of energy facilities and a vehicle for the stimu-
lation of public confidence in the fairness and justice of the process.
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Associate Professor
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Oil refineries, liquid natural gas complexes, nuclear power plants
and other large-scale energy facilities are often proposed and then not
built. Some particular facilities should never be built; the costs they
impose on society exceed their net benefits, and to the extent that the
siting process prevents the construction of facilities that are economi-
cally or socially costly it is doing a good job. But frequently, projects
that appear to provide substantial net benefits to society are defeated.
Many requirements must be considered in searching for a power plant
location.1 Finding sites that are technologically feasible, cost effective
as well as acceptable to utilities, regulatory agencies, "locals" and the
public-at-large, has become time-consuming and exacting. The difficulty
seems likely to grow as companies look for larger sites to accommodate ad-
ditional plants and, hopefully, lessen the 1umber of licensing confronta-
tions.
The present siting process has a tendency to favor minority opposi-
tion groups, both local and geographically diffuse; moreover, the potential
of the no-build option (a safeguard against truly objectionable and poten-
tially destructive projects) is often slighted. We would like to limit op-
position so as to affect those projects most deserving of obstruction.
Such opposition can be useful to the extent that it helps us discriminate
between good and bad projects.
The basic premise of this thesis is that power plant decisions meet
with opposition because of fundamental flaws in the way society has organ-
ized itself to make such decisions; resistance can largely be attributed to
7an erosion of confidence in the process by which decisions are reached.
While agreement on goals is probably unachievable -- since value conflict
is inevitable -- it is realistic to strive for a common feeling that the
decision process is a fair and balanced one, and that all parties should
therefore abide by its results.
Ours is a litigous social environment. As individuals have become
both more knowledgeable about how the law works and their rights with re-
ference to the law, as well as less submissive and more a).tetoated, they
have turned to litigation as either a way of expressing general dissatis-
faction with society or achieving a personal benefit. Under these circum-
stances, government should take cognizance of the legal and administrative
processes by which it seeks to achieve specific goals. Unfortunately, in
the case of siting energy facilities, the government has not done so. It
continues to employ the same mechanisms even though society's willingness
to live within or adapt to such mechanisms has changed.
The adaptive mechanism developed in this thesis is a draft proposal
for a general state siting law, the focus of which is a negotiation/com-
pensation scheme which recognizes economic and political realities. Com-
pensating individuals and communities in advance, minimizing adverse indi-
vidual and community impacts, and formalizing the negotiation processes
will enhance the possibilities for implementing net beneficial projects.
The ultimate goal is to have concerned citizens and industry feel comfor-
table with the way this process is conducted and, hopefully, be willing to
abide by its results.
In order to do this, we must review the current energy facility
siting process and explore its weaknesses, investigate the reasons to com-
pensate and negotiate; the validity of the initial assumption that such a
8scheme is (i) in the best interests of the community; and (ii) in the
best interests of the developer; and the feasibility of legally binding
agreements.
The Current Energy Facility Siting Process
The power facility site identification, review and selection pro-
cess is currently carried out by the utility companies which then must
obtain state and local approval. Figure 1.1 describes key events in the
site selection process.
The site(s) that are selected as proposed sites(s) by the utility
are then subject to an involved and time-consuming evaluation process by
9governmental licensing and regulatory authorities. Even though the re-
quirements of the site evaluation process are known to the utility in ad-
vance, these requirements are not necessarily dominant in the utility's
selection of preferred site alternatives. Government must weigh environ-
mental and social, as well as economic and technical, factors in the final
selection. While for non-nuclear facilities several agencies with differ-
ent objectives are involved in regulation and licensing, legal requirements
established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are paramount in
the selection of sites for nuclear facilities.
Public attitudes on key issues associated with power facility siting
have strongly influenced the evolution of the site evaluation and approval
process. In the broadest terms, site evaluation has developed along the
following lines:2
. The earliest regulations were concerned with insuring that
land acquisition rules and ordinances were complied with,
and that electric rates provided an equitable rate of re-
turn on investment in the new facilities.
. During the late 1950s and early 1960s regulation at the
federal level was focused on the safety of power plant oper-
ation, particularly for nuclear power plants. Recently,
these early safety criteria have been challenged and addi-
tional emphasis has been focused on the safety and security
problems associated with the transportation, reprocessing
and storage of nuclear fuel and radioactive waste products.
. During the late 1960s emphasis was also placed on insuring
that power facilities were in compliance with environmental
law and did not significantly degrade the quality of the
local environment.
. During the early 1970s new regulatory emphasis was focused
on establishing the need for each facility addition and on
establishing that the specific site and type of facility
selected were consistent with projections of need.
FIGURE 1.1. KEY EVENTS IN THE SITE-SELECTION PROCESS BY ENERGY DEVELOPERS
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. Very recently, increasing emphasis has been placed on
insuring that the type of facility selected is consistent
with a region's primary energy requirements and availabil-
ity profile and with future requirements.
This evolution of site approval legislation and requirements has
led to the current situation in which a variety of public agencies hold
jurisdiction over various aspects of facility siting. Table 1.2 indicates
that in the case of Boston Edison's nuclear Pilgrim Unit #1, for example,
46 different permits or approvals were required from seventeen federal,
state and local jurisdictions; many of these actions involved receiving
the same permit from different agencies.
The Environmental Impact Review/Environmental Impact Statement
(EIR/EIS) process does not come into play, for the most part, until after
sites have been selected and land has been acquired by the applicant. The
traditional approach to facility siting by the private utilities puts the
public, and especially those adversely aff cted by a proposed facility, in
the position of "spoilers". The public review process (EIR/EIS) begins
at the point when the utility feels it has nearly completed its work.
Because the private process for site selection and the public pro-
cess for project evaluation do not occur simultaneously, site selection
encounters long delays and results are less predictable.
Previous analysis has demonstrated that there are certain generic
problems with the current siting process. The Energy Impacts Project (EIP),
under the direction of Professor Michael O'Hare, has developed a theoreti-
cal base for understanding ways to improve the siting process. These theo-
12
TABLE 1.2 3
PERMITS REQUIRED FOR CONSTRUCTION AND INITIAL OPERATION OF BOSTON EDISON'S
PILGRIM STATION-UNIT #1*
I. TOWN OF PLYMOUTH
Board of Appeals
- A special permit to authorize use of the plant site
. Commission of Public Safety
- Permits to build structures
- Permits for alterations and repairs (to existing structures
at site)
- Electrical wiring permits
- Plumbing permit
- Elevator inspection certificates
. Board of Health
- Disposal works construction permits
. Fire Department
- Fuel oil storage permit
. Town - General
- Construct and repair sewage disposal system
- Permission to work overtime at site
- Transmission line tree trimming
- Permission to cross public ways with overhead wires
II.'- COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
. Massachusetts Department of Public Works
- Application for a construction permit for Pilgrim #1 was filed in
June, 1967, and the plant became operational in July, 1972.
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TABLE 1.2 (continued)
- Access road connection to Route lA
- Placement of oceanographic instruments
- Waterfront construction and dredging
- Transmission crossings
- Tree trimming
. Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities
- Transmission-certificate of convenience and necessity
- Transmission-right of eminent domain
- Transmission-exemption from zoning
. Massachusetts Department of Public Health, State Examiners of
Plumbers
- Sanitary permits for station and recreational areas
. Massachusetts Department of Public Health, Board of Environ-
mental Health
- Permit to operate heating boiler
- Permit to operate temporary startup boiler
- Approval of station operating procedures
- Approval of all interconnections between city water line
and plant water systems (i.e., fire protection, make-up
demineralizer)
. Massachusetts Department of Public Safety, Division of Fire
Prevention
- Fuel storage permits
- Use of explosives
. Massachusetts Department of Public Safety, Board of Boiler
Rules
- Heating boiler operating permits
14
TABLE 1.2 (continued)
- Pressure vessel inspection certificates
. Massachusetts Water Resources Commission
- Salt water use permit
- Permit to conduct marine hydrology studies
- Water quality certificate
. Massachusetts Department of Natural Resources
- Breakwater construction and dredging permit
- Transmission line easement in state forest
. Massachusetts State Board of Labor and Industries
- Boston Edison has registered with the Massachusetts Board
of Labor and Industries for storage of radioactive sources
III. U.S. GOVERNMENT
. United States Atomic Energy Commission (now NRC)
- Exemption to place concrete before receipt of an official
construction permit
- Pilgrim Station construction permit
- Nuclear fuel storage
- Nuclear source storage
- Licensing of station operators
- Pilgrim Station operating permit
. United States Army Corps of Engineers
- Placement of oceanographic instruments
- Waterfront construction, dredging and spoil disposal
*
The AEC (now NRC) Construction Permit process, including preparation
of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) is by far the most involved
element of the site approval process.
15
TABLE 1.2 (continued)
- Water refuse (Environmental Protection Agency)
Federal Aviation Administration
- Meteorology tower construction
- Main off-gas stack construction and lighting
16
ries have been explicated through case studies that have generated a num-
ber of hypotheses regarding compensation through negotiation.
Why Compensate?
The benefits and costs from a given energy development are often
asymmetric. The benefits of an energy development are distributed region-
ally (e.g., less expensive or more readily available energy) or even nation-
ally (e.g., increased energy independence), whereas the costs are largely
borne by individuals who live near the development. On the grounds of
equity and efficiency, this mismatch should be reduced; one way to achieve
this is for the beneficiaries of energy development to compensate the losers
for their incurred costs.4
If we site a facility without compensating losers, then we set a
precedent. Since people are generally aver se to risk, they avoid choices
that threaten them with an uncompensated loss -- even if they are actually
"fair bets".
Here, "efficiency" refers to society's use of its resources; a pol-
icy which causes people to change from more to less efficient investments
reduces overall economic planning. Thus, today's siting precedent reduces
the efficiency of future decisions and produces demoralization costs.*5
The initial point of facility impact is on governments, while other
impacts are visited directly upon individuals. Increased demand for public
*
Demoralization costs are reductions in future net benefits which
occur when a current decision limits future choice. See Frank I. Michel-
man, "Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundation
of 'Just Compensation' Law," in Harvard Law Review, Vol. 80 (1967), p.
1214 ff.
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services is an example of the former; and increased housing costs is an
example of the latter. Ultimately, however, all the impacts of energy
development are borne by.individuals: it is taxpayers, not governments,
who shoulder the larger tax burdens necessary to finance increased levels
of public services.
One proposition which developed out of case studies in western
boomtowns is that individuals, rather than whole communities, ought to be
compensated for a myriad of changes resulting from energy development.
6
These changes range from social impacts such as disruption of community
social relations to economic impacts such as inflation, to impacts on the
natural environment such as increased air and water pollution.
It has been further argued that only the original residents of a
community experiencing energy development deserve compensation, since de-
velopment has foreclosed one of their options: they can no longer live in
7
the community as it existed prior to development. Immigrants who move to
the community to do construction work or to enter secondary sectors such
as retailing are not deserving candidates for development-related compensa-
tion, for it is implicit in each newcomer's decision that this choice will
leave him better off than would not having moved to the community.8
In addition to individual compensation, however, some costs, such
as public service shortfalls, fall on the community as a whole and may be
compensated through tax payments. While many impacts accompanying energy
facilities are economic (fiscal) in nature and thus quantifiable, others
are social or environmental, difficult to enumerate and even more difficult
to fix with a monetary value. "In-kind" compensation offsets the impact
9
of development by other than monetary means. A developer/utility may pro-
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vide a new park which, while not restoring the community to its previous
state, may provide a trade-off that meets with favorable community reaction.
Wildlife preserves to satisfy environmental concerns, providing a buffer,
offsetting impacts of other facilities, or offering additional neighborhood
or community facilities are all potential means of compensation.
Other ways in which companies can facilitate compensation include
prepayment of local taxes, underwriting the cost of needed public facilities
or services, guarantee of municipal bonds, making loans to local govern-
ments, providing technical or planning assistance, supervising the construc-
tion or operation of public facilities, and monitoring the fiscal, environ-
mental and social impacts that accompany energy development despite mitiga-
tion programs.
To interest an energy company in conducting impact-mitigation and
compensation programs, communities can adopt taxation and regulation poli-
cies that permit energy development, promise to publicize widely the local
effects of energy development both beneficial and adverse, and demonstrate
substantial intent and ability to act in cooperation with the company.10
Compensating for fiscal, environmental and social costs could cause
developers:
(i) to choose a different site than they would have otherwise;
(ii) to prefer a different project design or technology; or
(iii) to reject a project totally.
By compensating individuals and community for negative impacts of
energy facilities, we bring these costs into the cost/benefit calculations
and thereby (i) present a truer picture of the project's impacts on society,
and (ii) force the developer to respond fully.
19
Negotiation and Mediation
EIP case studies describe negotiation as a procedure that inevitably
improves the overall siting process. Negotiation is the medium for inclu-
sion of individual and community estimates of social costs which, in turn,
enables developers to anticipate the degree of resistance to energy develop-
ment and induces the developers to choose socially-preferable sites.
When disputes are caused by misunderstandings, communication between
the conflicting groups can lead to improved comprehension of positions, and
perhaps generate some agreement. The Seabrook nuclear plant controversy
serves as an example of what can occur in a process which does not allow
for negotiation among concerned and affected parties. As presently struc-
tured, the siting process allows for the consideration of alternatives
through the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (and also through the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in the case of a nuclear plant). The
major difficulty, as experienced at Seabrook, is that the consideration of
alternative sites occurs too late to be meaningful -- the amount of invest-
ment made in the "original" site and the "momentum" behind it ensure that
it alone will be considered.1 1
Litigation often causes. environmental disputants to focus on tech-
nicalities of law and procedure. For example, opponents of nuclear power
often dispute the effects of a plant's cooling system, although the basic
opposition is to nuclear power. Major steps are then taken to improve the
operation of the cooling system, even though it is only a minor concern of
plant opponents.. This is less satisfactory than dealing directly with the
issue of whether or not the country should deploy the technology in ques-
20
tion, an issue which could be dealt with head-on through negotiation.
The law currently compels neither side to negotiate but ensures
almost everyone's right to litigate. Neither side would rationally seek
to negotiate until it felt that the benefits of negotiation would outweigh
the costs. Industry has little incentive to negotiate if it believes it
can build a plant despite objections, or if it believes that no concession
will reduce opposition or ensure development. Opposition groups have lit-
tle incentive to negotiate if they believe that they can win in a judicial
forum. Likewise, if they adopt a long-run strategy which seeks to raise
the cost of a new technology through litigation delays, then bargaining
will hold no attraction for them.
The involvement of government regulatory groups as parties to the
conflict usually adds another dimension to the negotiation. Negotiated
settlements may require governmental approval, zoning variances, or other
special considerations which neither project opponents nor proponents can
deliver.
The incentives for private companies to negotiate with proposed
host communities and individuals originate in the profit motive. The
corporation's intention to maintain long-term viability and mitigate prob-
lems fosters the positive community relations that are essential to an
energy company's plans to maintain long-term growth. Corporate profit
depends on low employee turnover and high worker productivity which, in
turn, requires that each facility's working environment be acceptable to
employees. For both reasons, corporate mitigation of adverse impacts is
of the highest concern to energy companies. 1 2
The concept of mediation techniques derives from the model of
21
labor-management negotiation. Susskind, Richardson and Hildebrand posit
that the labor-management analogy may be inappropriate or at least ineffi-
cient.13 They point out that:
Labor-management disputes are bi-lateral; environmental
disputes [or those revolving around development] are
usually multi-lateral.
In labor-management negotiation, it is usually clear
who represents labor and who represents management (and
they are usually empowered to speak for the interests
they represent). It is much less clear who should be a
party to environmental mediation efforts.
In a labor-management dispute, both sides have a strong
incentive to bargain. Neither side really wants a
strike. In many environmental disputes it is not clear
that those who want to stop a project have a motive to
sit down at the bargaining table [or that the developer
has with whom to bargain].
In a labor-management dispute it is not that difficult
to identify the terms of the bargaining, although it
may be hard to define the right level of salaries,
fringe benefits, seniority rights, working conditions,
etc. to change. In environmental disputes, it is un-
clear what the terms of bargaining ought to be. Issues
are usually framed in an all-or-nothing way, the pro-
spects for identifying fair trades or compensation in
environmental disputes are, at present, slim.1 4
Encouragement of negotiation requires the initiation of new proce-
dures and institutions. These new procedures must solve the thorny prob-
lems of recognizing particular groups as parties to a negotiation and must
assure the representation of the different interests. It is essential to
define who has a stake in the outcome of a conflict and who can speak for
the groups involved; at the same time, there will also be a need to limit
the number of participants in order to avoid cumbersome negotiations and
runaway costs.
It is also necessary to find intervenors, facilitators, or neutral
22
parties with credibility in the eyes of the groups or interests participa-
ting; narrow the agenda of issues to be negotiated; create situations in
which the bargains that are made can be held secure; and ensure that the
incentives to bargain are substantial. Additionally, the creation of bar-
gaining deadlines would encourage progress in negotiations. These new
procedures must, therefore, produce incentives that facilitate bargaining
and avoid the creation of still another step on the path to litigation.
Delay
The consequences of delaying an energy project are asymmetrical.
Long court delays may have disastrous economic effects on an electric
utility, which will inevitably affect the entire consuming public, but they
impose much smaller costs -- even benefits -- on individual or small groups
of litigants.
The legal and administrative framework of the energy facility siting
process is itself a major source of distortion because of the important
role time plays in the choice of location. For one thing, postponement can
be just as costly as blind progress. Every month of delay in the scheduled
operation of a nuclear power plant can run in the millions of dollars.
1 5
Moreover, any unexpected lengthening of the construction period can harm
the developer's financial integrity and eventually prove fatal to the pro-
ject. The longer the construction period, the more the firm must borrow
and the greater its interest payments. Meeting increased interest payments
may require additional capital funding. Since the construction costs of
many energy facilities built by regulated utilities cannot be charged to
the rate base until the facility begins operating, a regulated developer
23
may not be able to obtain the needed funds from operating revenues. Nor
can even an unregulated developer profit from a partially-built refinary.
This shortfall eventually forces the developer either to dip into liquid
reserves or to reduce dividend payments, which in turn restricts access
to financial markets and to funds needed to finish construction. The de-
veloper may decide that, although a facility may eventually earn an accep-
table return, the short-term costs of further delay are too great to con-
tinue the project.
A less recognized effect of delay is that it almost always shifts
the incidence of environmental impacts as well. Prolonged litigation over
the development of a hydroelectric facility at Storm King Mountain in New
York, for example, is reported to have had a profound effect on the mix of
plants in the New York City area.16 By forcing delays in the scheduled re-
tirement of older oil-burning plants, the scenic qualities of the Hudson
River seem partly to have been preserved at the expense of air quality in
Manhattan.
Pro-facility groups, on the other hand, do not have comparable op-
tions to speed up the siting of a plant. The process is designed more to
protect society from decisions to site bad projects than to expedite deci-
sions to site good ones.
Delay is an indicator of ad hoc decision-making. Important policy
issues are being made on a case-by-case basis. The longer-term consequen-
ces of a set of decisions is not being considered. Neither the objectives
of securing adequate power supplies nor that of protecting environmental
values is well served in the long-run by a process marred by alienation
and drawn out by legal battles.
24
Legally Binding Agreements
The ability of communities or environmental groups to bind them-
selves to an agreement is severely limited. No group can represent all
environmental concerns, nor unequivocally commit its entire membership to
a course of action. For example, in a nuclear power plant dispute, environ-
mental groups can sign a consent decree withdrawing their objection to the
issuance of a construction permit. They cannot, however, limit the inter-
vention of other environmental groups in the proceedings on either the
same or different grounds, or prevent splinter groups or even individuals
from their own organization from continuing opposition. Likewise, a local
government cannot commit members of the community to refrain from opposing
a development through litigation.
Therefore, the developer currently has little incentive to provide
compensation to a community or opposition roup -- the developer is not
bound by law to do so and, without some form of community opposition group
commitment, will receive nothing in return for such payment.
Contracts, performance bonds, indemnification agreements, insurance
against impacts and the ratification of agreements by court order are all
potential mechanisms for compensating governments, individuals or groups
which bear the negative side-effects of development. However, none of
these techniques solves the problem of binding members of communities or
diffuse interest groups to agreements reached through negotiation.
Susskind, Richardson and Hildebrand posit that, with legislation,
one could bind individuals to an agreement by setting up a process whereby
a court supervises the selection of representatives to act as agents of
25
recognized interests.18 They build on the analogy of the procedure cur-
*
rently employed to appoint representatives to class action suits.
This type of legislation would be most difficult to pass politically,
let alone'to implement. Beyond these constraints is the question of how
desirable is "judicial supervision"? If we succeed in binding individuals
to these agreements, are we muzzling opposition instead of merely removing
some of their incentives to oppose?
Legislation recognizing the right of communities to compensation
for damage caused by energy facilities could take on a variety of forms.
That which seems most appealing in its simplicity and efficacy is suggested
by David Kretzmer in his paper, "Creating Binding Compensation Agreements
between Developers and Host Communities."20 He opts for legislation grant-
ing a general right to compensation with details and amounts to be worked
out by negotiation. As part of the state :eviewing process for energy
facilities, approval for construction would not be granted unless the de-
veloper had satisfied the reviewing board that it would compensate the host.
community for damages which would be caused by the facility. No provision
would be provided by the statute, including the negotiation clause, as to
what exact damage would be compensable at what rate. The reviewing board
would presumably be satisfied with any compensation provisions which re-
ceived joint community/developer approval. A system similar to this oper-
ates in the state of Washington -- apparently with some success.21
*
In class action suits:
"The court supervises the selection process to ensure that the agent selec-
ted is truly representative of the interests of the class and ensures that
the class has truly homogenous interests. By statute, it is possible to
bind all members of a class to an agreement entered into by the represen-
tative. 19
26
Such mandatory compensation has a number of advantages: (1) the
legislation grants potential host/affected communities the power of veto;
(2) it is not overly complicated; (3) it assumes that the right to compen-
sation will reduce opposition to facilities but is not used as an excuse
to prohibit such opposition; and (4) by legalizing the right to compensa-
tion, such legislation would legitimize compensation in the eyes of both
parties, eliminating any hint of bribery. The scheme is not without short-
comings, as (1) it does not guarantee against a community's delaying a
project, and (2) it does not bind residents to accept the facility.
If the compensation agreements tie payments to various stages of
progress in the construction of the facility, it should severely limit the
occasions for communities to unleash opposition after the agreement had
been made and the company too far committed to back out. In regard to the
second point, the incentive of residents tc oppose will be weakened if an
attempt is made to divide some of the compensation received among affected
residents.2 2
An insurance scheme covering (1) calamities and unforeseen events,
and (2) diminution in individual property values with the burden of proof
on the landowner would be further incentive for both parties to stick to
their agreements. Various appraisal techniques already in existence could
be used to measure the extent of "wipeouts" (diminutions in property value)
resulting from the facility. Insurance against the chance that the im-
pacts will be greater than what was predicted or anticipated guarantees the
parties to the agreement that they will be "held harmless". Amounts of
insurance would be set by state enabling legislation.
Current court decisions (i.e., Penn Central Transportation Company
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versus City of New York)23 concerned with claims of landowners regarding
the impact of regulation on a parcel's capacity to earn a reasonable re-
turn, ensure that nondollar compensation in mitigating overregulation be
economically grounded in a police power rather than an eminent domain basis.
However, it still seems very unlikely that the courts can establish work-
able rules that would readily distinguish vaguely compensable from vaguely
noncompensable situations. The standards that have been set are essenti-
ally standards for judicial review of legislative and administrative pro-
grams for compensation. To avoid litigation each time a transaction takes
place, the standards must be translated into more concrete and quantified
form by the legislatures that implement compensatory programs. These
legislative efforts must consider the ethical implications as well as ac-
counting aspects. Case-by-case adjudication should not be the primary
method of refining society's compensation practices.
These generic siting issues can be reduced to a set of subissues
that include:
. the multiplicity of regulatory agencies;
the determination of energy needs;
making of energy policy;
. the timeliness of public participation;
technical assessment;
consideration of alternatives.
28
Multiplicity of Agencies
Frequently, citizens have found an appreciation for the "big pic-
ture" lacking in governmental regulation of utility proposals, and have
therefore turned a critical eye to the bureaucratic practices of the li-
censing agencies. Here, what is revealed more often than not is rigid ad-
herence to narrow procedures, and to counteract this so-called "tunnel
vision," groups often feel it necessary to initiate direct court action.
Regulatory authority is fragmented across technologies and across categor-
ies of impact. Thus, no single agency has a perspective broad enough to
consider all relevant trade-offs, and there is no inclination to second-
guess the developer on choices made earlier in its planning. The fragmen-
ted review of energy facility proposals results in a situation where many
agencies look at a single alternative in a narrow way, while a broad per-
spective encompassing many alternatives is conspicuously absent. Also,
the scheduling of the review process is such that many options are fore-
closed by the time agencies begin their evaluation, because strong forces
have developed for approval of the proposed project.
In order to (i) balance competing interests, (ii) consider issues
which have historically fallen through the cracks of separate agency re-
views, and (iii) allow government to address complex issues in a coherent
fashion, authority to regulate energy facilities should be centralized in
a single state agency and care must be taken to equip it with appropriate
administrative and financial resources. While creation of such an agency
may be viewed as bureaucratic proliferation, it has two overriding advan-
tages over existing agencies: there is no bias by virtue of history or
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incumbent staff, and the ability of both energy development-oriented and
environmental agencies to play a strong advocacy role in the review process
can be preserved.
Needs Assessment
Forecasting methods often do little more than extrapolate from his-
toric trends, are insensitive to "end use" needs, and consider a limited
number of options.
In order to address questions concerning alternative ways of meeting
anticipated loads, conservation, efficient use of existing equipment and
safety of the energy facility itself, needs assessments must be based on
inventories of current facilities, estimates of future capacities, and eval-
uations of technological capabilities. They must also include an extrapo-
lation of demand in light of proposed growth rates and assumptions about
changes in demand. The assessments should be made at the state level with
interagency cooperation to ensure'that the necessary information is at
hand. The utilities should also participate in preparing the assessments,
especially with respect to technical options and defining existing capa-
city.
Energy Policy
There is no state-wide energy policy. An energy policy must set
priorities and describe strategies for meeting the needs assessment.
Public Participation
While in principle the licensing proceedings of energy facilities
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are to allow full, free and honest discussion of all relevant issues with
the public-at-large, in practice the regulatory process has not provided
for effective communication among concerned parties.24 For example, no
vehicle for public participation is employed throughout the agency review
process, and the formal public hearing is not held until after an agency
has tentatively decided to approve the project. The only way a concerned
citizen can directly influence the decision is to try to stop ic by be-
coming an intervenor in an adjudicatory hearing.
Public participation infers that the whole process should work to
create an involved and informed citizenry. Participation must be available
to a broad and representative group of individuals and organizations, and
interaction must be timely and designed so as not to exclude or discourage
participation. The public must be confident that all views, needs, and
suggestions are being fully accounted for and that an equitable solution
to a difficult problem is actively being sought.
Technical Assessment
The technically-trained professional is no longer assumed to make de-
cisions about large-scale projects in an abstract, supposedly "objective" way.
Technical assessment cannot be divorced from the political process
and therefore must be formally linked to a negotiation scheme.
Quality of Decision-making
It is important to assemble a competent decision-making body that
can command a high level of public respect, as an agency can be no better
than the people who run it!
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Consideration of Alternatives
The range of alternatives must be made broad- enough to represent
real choices and must include the option of doing nothing. Alternatives
should not be limited to construction-related plans, and should specifical-
ly include measures to distribute benefits broadly and provide compensation
where necessary to achieve equity.
Identification of Effects
Adequate information must be made available on the adverse and bene-
ficial effects of each alternative, and on the incidence of those effects.
Any effects which any particular interest thinks are important should be
included, whether or not they can be readily quantified.
Clarification of Trade-offs
Trade-offs must be highlighted and the issues of choice fully clari-
fied. Uncertainties which may exist should be explicitly identified, and
careful consideration should be given to options left open or foreclosed by
proposed alternatives.
Incorporation of Values
All affected interests should have full opportunity for timely and
constructive involvement of all phases of activity, and should have full
access to relevant data. Careful attention must be paid to the views,
needs, and suggestions of different groups, and equitable solutions must
actively be sought.
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Introduction
This chapter will describe and detail how the reforms suggested in
Chapter One might be accomplished through new state legislation. The legis-
lation will create an Energy Facility Siting Agency (EFSA) which will develop
energy policies and procedures for licensing sites.
The chapter will emphasize the need for building upon the results
of federal research; will call for the development of facility siting guide-
lines that are tailored to differences among complex energy technologies;
will require an assessment of future energy demands, as well as an overall
energy policy to serve as an explicit framework for evaluating proposed pro-
jects; will seek to promote development of energy policy; and will involve
communities in the implementation process. The legislation will also estab-
lish a mediation council that includes energy companies, local governments,
EFSA and an independent mediator. The mediation council will be responsible
for negotiating appropriate compensation for parties adversely affected by
siting decisions. The concepts of negotiation and compensation are central
to the purpose of the legislation.
It is important to recognize, however, that legislation is just the
starting point for policy-making; administrative implementation has been
known to depart from the tentative direction set by the legislature. The
execution of policy depends heavily on the political orientation of respon-
sible managers, on the way in which personality conflicts are resolved, and
on informal understandings among the key actors (i.e., the legislature, the
executive and various interest groups). Siting decisions have economic,
environmental and social consequences. Anticipated disruptions or economic
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losses trigger strong emotional reactions. Legislation cannot erase strong
emotional and economic motivations. It can, however, set up a framework
for addressing conflict so that compromise can be affected through negoti-
ated trade-offs.
The framework for this legislation is built upon a set of working
principles which are used as criteria for the general guidelines of the
suggested legislation to follow. The working principles are derived from
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general organizational theories and their incorporation into the legisla-
tion should enhance the siting process.
(a) Minimization of Lines of Command. The fewer layers of govern-
ment which regulate and through which funds must pass, the fewer delays in
the operation, and the clearer the delineation of responsibilities.
(b) Coordination. The more explicit the role of each level and the
more direct the line of relationship, the greater the possibilities for de-
veloping effective coordination. Coordinating mechanisms must take into
account existing functions and responsibilities at the state, local and
federal levels.
(c) Legal Authority. In all policy matters, clarity of legal author-
ity is very important. Those who are asked to implement must have the power
to do so.
(d) Political Responsibility. A balance must be struck between the
exercise of authority that responds to the desires of the local majority,
at the same time allowing for minority opinion to be heard, and that which
responds to more general state/national needs.
This legislation provides a framework in which the state/national
governments set technological guidelines and standards, and the local
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governments provide primary input and maintain veto power over siting and
construction.
While the following draft proposal provides a model for state legis-
latures, variations will undoubtedly be necessary in order to ensure confor-
mance with existing statutes and regulations in any particular state.
ENERGY FACILITY SITING ACT - Snynopsis of Objectives
1. To determine the energy needs of the state and to ensure that the
facilities needed to provide adequqte energy supplies are built.
2. To encourage expeditious and efficient planning and siting of energy
facilities.
3. To ensure that the socio-economic impacts of proposed facilities are
evaluated in the assessment of any site.
4. To ensure, through the reduction of conflict, more efficient and
.equitable siting of energy facilities by compensating residents as well
as localities adversely affected by a proposed energy facility.
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ENERGY FACILITY SITING ACT
Draft Proposal 3/10/79
Section 1.
Section 2.
Section 3.
Section 4.
Section 5.
Section 6.
Section 7.
Section 8.
Section 9.
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Section 11.
Section 12.
Section 13.
Section 14.
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Creation of the Energy Facility Siting Agency
Definition of EFSA Powers
Energy Policy Formation
Needs Assessment
Citizen Participation Requirements
Project Nomination
Request for Site Proposals
Site Nomination
Environmental Impact Review Process
Technical Assessment of Site:
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Commitments
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Section 1. Definitions
1. "Bid" refers to an offer, by the local jurisdiction, of what is
acceptable compensation and mitigation. An accepted bid attests
to a locality's intent to facilitate the development of the energy
facility in return for compensation by the project nominator (the
developer).
2. "Community" refers to the residents in an area surrounding a pro-
spective energy facility site, provided that the community shall
be represented by a legal organ, such as local government.
3. "Compensation" refers to the amount of indemnification paid by a
developer to a local jurisdiction and its residents at the time
of the bid, in exchange for the right to develop an energy facil-
ity. "Residents at the time of the bid" refers to those persons
legally residing within the local jurisdiction at that time.
4. "Energy facility" refers to any of the following facilities:
(a) electric generating plants with a capacity of 150 mega-watts
or more; (b) petroleum refineries with a capacity of 25,000 bar-
rels per day or more of crude oil; (c) synthetic gasification
plants, oil shale extraction operations, and processing plants,
coal liquification and gasification plants, liquified natural
gas conversion facilities, and uranium enrichment facilities;
(d) offshore petroleum loading of marine transfer facilities
within state jurisdiction; (e) underground or strip coal mine
operations; and (f) any other facilities or additions to facili-
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ties defined and identified by the EPSA Board pursuant to
this Act.
5. "Energy Facility Siting Board" is composed of five members
appointed by the Governor.
6. "Local jurisdiction" refers to any general purpose unit of
local government as defined by the Bureau of Census or which
is deemed by the Governor and the courts to have authority
to represent its constituents in contractual agreements.
7. "Mediation Council" is composed of project nominator, a pro-
fessional staff member from EPSA, an independent mediator
appointed by the Governor of the state, and for each site a
site representative.
8. "Mitigation" refers to measures taken to nullify the adverse
effects upon a community or its residents of an energy facil-
ity through such techniques as change in facility design or
in physical or social structures within the community.
9. "Negotiation" refers to the bargaining process which takes
place within the mediation council enabling site and project
nominators to agree on compensation and mitigation measures.
10. "Project Nominator" refers to any corporation or person(s)
who propose to develop and "energy facility."
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11. "Site" refers to any proposed or approved location of an energy
facility.
12. "Site Nominator" refers to any local jurisdiction which proposes
to locate an energy facility within its jurisdiction.
13. "Social and economic costs" refer to the negated effects upon the
community of construction and operation of the energy facility.
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Section 2. Creation of a State Energy Facility Siting Agency (EFSA)
This section creates a state agency that will have primary regulatory
power over the location, design and operation of nonnuclear energy facil-
ities. The agency will have licensing jurisdiction over all energy
facilities within the state and will establish a mediation council and
finance its operations. The agency's budget will be part of the Gover-
nor's executive budget rather than part of another state agency's budget.
To ensure that the complex issues involved in the construction and oper-
ation of energy facilities are dealt with in a comprehensible fashion,
that competing interests are balanced, and that the siting process it-
self is free of bias:
1. The Energy Facility Siting Agency (EFSA) is hereby created by
this Legislative Act.
2. The Governor, with the advice and consent of the legislature,
shall appoint five members to the EFSA Governing Board. These
members shall have knowledge or experience relating narrowly to
energy systems or more broadly to land use problems.
3. The EFSA Governing Board will appoint the EFSA Director. The
Director will appoint the staff, including administrative and
research personnel.
4. All Governing Board appointments and the appointment of the Di-
rector will be co-terminous with the term of the Governor.
5. The EFSA will be an independent agency of state government respon-
sible directly to the Governor. Its budget will be part of the
Governor's executive budget.
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Section 3. Definition of EFSA Powers
This section outlines the powers accorded the EFSA in this legislation.
EFSA shall have the following powers:
(a) develop a state energy policy.
(b) conduct a state energy needs assessment.
(c) ensure adequate citizen participation.
(d) review project nominations for compliance with already existing
state and federal regulations.
(e) request site nomination proposals.
(f) conduct technical assessment of all nominated sites.
(g) assure that each niminated site has an Environmental Impact
Report (EIR).
(h) establish a mediation council for negotiating levels of compen-
sation.
(i) exercise licensing power over the siting and construction of
all non-nuclear energy facilities. With reference to nuclear
facilities where the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is the
regulatory agency, the EFSA will carry out those regulations
for which it is legally responsible, being especially careful
not to abrogate any of its rights to the NRC, especially if
EFSA standards are more stringent than those of the NRC.
In evaluating proposed energy facilities and specific sites,
the EFSA must consider energy supply as well as safety and
environmental objectives as indicated by environmental interest
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groups. Other state agencies must be formally consulted, but
they may not exercise veto power over site and construction
licensing.
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Section 4. Energy Policy
This section deals with the development of state energy policy. The EFSA
is responsible for formulating the policy and keeping it up-to-date in light
of national and state energy forecasts, the development of alternative energy
technologies, and energy consumption patterns.
To develop a statement of energy priorities for the state of
1. The EFSA must develop policies in accordance with national energy
legislative and agency programs.
2. The state-wide energy policy must include:
(a) a ranking by priority of different energy technologies accor-
ding to available natural resources, the state environmental
base, and commitment to existing facilities' infrastructure.
(b) programs to pursue new energy sources, including a recommen-
dation on the degree to which the state should support re-
search and development for each technology beyond that under-
taken by the federal government.
(c) conservation programs tailored to the state's economic, socio-
logical, environmental, and climatic constraints.
(d) plans to manage crises, or to accommodate the dislocations or
inequities resulting from inaccurate needs assessments or fail-
ure to provide energy sources.
(e) the EFSA must update this policy with each renewal of the ten-
ure of its Governing Board (or every fifth year, if guberna-
torial terms are only two, rather than four, years).
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Section 5. Needs Assessment
This section mandates a state needs assessment to be conducted by the EFSA
every fifth year. The assessment is based on trends in energy consumption,
price elasticity, conservation practices, changes in rate structures used
by energy distributors, energy technologies and site-specific resources.
To address questions concerning alternative ways of meeting anticipated
loads, conservation, efficient use of existing equipment and safety of the
energy facility itself, as well as all other aspects of the fuel cycle in
(state)
1. The EFSA screens entire state and prepares preliminary report con-
taining an assessment of energy needs according to time-horizons
used in national energy policy-making. Sources of data include
utility companies and state and federal agencies. EFSA shall have
subpoena power to secure utility company studies.
2. The assessment of demand must reflect changes/trends in energy con-
sumption brought about by higher prices of energy, price elasticity,
conservation practices stimulated by consumer education, and overall
national energy policy.
3. The assessment must include an inventory of the physical plant and
markets for existing energy facilities within the state and in bor-
dering areas that serve as suppliers or markets.
4. The assessment must reflect the impact of changes in current rate
structure used by utilities and other energy distributors.
5. The assessment must include as an alternative, the possibility of
meeting anticipated power loads through purchase of power from sour-
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ces currently being used, both major power grid systems, and
local, potenti- self-contained systems.
6. Needs assessmc should take into account trends that may limit the
need for additional capacity, such as governmental, industrial or pri-
vate conservation measures that reduce the rate of growth in demand.
7. The assessment must include consideration of experimentally-tested
new technologies which could influence demand and provide alterna-
tive supplies of energy.
8. The assessment must include, for each technology, a review of exis-
ting points-of-view on the safety of all aspects of the fuel cycle,
including, in the case of nuclear power, the hazards connected with
transporting, processing and storing large amounts of radioactive
wastes.
9. The assessment must identify the reliability of the needs according
to time-frames appropriate to each of the technologies.
10. In order to ensure the inclusion of all pertinent information, a
preliminary report is to be circulated for review and comment among
agencies concerned with the following areas:
(a) Public Utilities;
(b) Science and Technology;
(c) Economic Planning and Development;
(d) Environment (Land, Air and Water Management).
11. The preliminary report must be circulated among utility companies
throughout the state for review and comment and made available to
the general public upon request.
12. The preliminary report is to be published one month in advance of
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public hearings.
13. Upon completion of steps one through twelve, the EFSA must prepare
a final report which incorporates initial assessment and inter-
agency, utility and public input. An initial statement of environ-
mental advantages and disadvantages of each technology is included.
14. The assessment should be updated every fifth year in concert with
the energy policy of the state.
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Section 6. Citizen Participation Requirements
This section deals with the establishment of mechanisms for citizen parti-
cipation in the site-licensing process, and the creation of the post of
ombudsman. Citizen participation is desirable, not only on the grounds of
political expediency, but because people are less likely to oppose a deci-
sion which they have helped to make.
To ensure citizen participation in the energy facility siting process:
1. The minimum guidelines for public participation in the development
and revision of all regulations are:
(a) the EFSA must hold public hearings on proposed criteria and
standards to guide the site selection and evaluation process.
The Governing Board has the responsibility for developing and
enforcing these standards and (riteria.
(b) the EFSA must hold public hearings when revising any regula-
tions.
(c) all EFSA meetings must be open to the public, and all records,
files and correspondence must be available for public inspec-
tion. The Governing Board can reserve the right to hold Exec-
utive Sessions in reviewing the reports of the mediation coun-
cil. Mediation councils also reserve the right to hold Exec-
utive Sessions.
(d) announcements of public hearings will be publicized in such
media as television and radio broadcasts and newspapers two
weeks prior to the specific event. The EFSA shall allocate
percent of its budget for public participation purposes.
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(e) a post within the EFSA will be established for an ombudsman,
whose duty it will be to ensure that concerned citizens are
involved in the proceedings by being given opportunities to
present oral and written testimony.
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Section 7. Project Nomination
In this section a project nomination process is developed. An energy com-
pany wishing to build a specific facility must submit a "nomination" to
the EFSA describing the particular technology, how such a facility would
fit in with the state's energy policy and needs assessment, and the site
characteristics necessary for the development of such a facility. The com-
pany is not nominating a specific site; rather, it is describing the de-
sirable characteristics of possible sites.
To inform the state of a desire to construct an energy facility:
1. Public utilities, publicly-financed energy development corporations
and private industries seeking a license for a particular project
must inform the EFSA, via a written nomination, of the type of tech-
nology and the methods of financing which will be employed by the
applicant in constructing a facility.
2. The nomination must include:
(a) a description of the technology, its size, production goals
and expected capital costs at existing bonded interest rates,
services required (water, roads, sewer), needed work force
(numbers and skills), and projected construction schedule.
(b) the physical characteristics of a particular desirable site(s).
(c) a description of all necessary connections between the pro-
posed project and existing power distribution networks.
(d) an assessment of the role the project will play in meeting the
state's energy production needs.
3. The EFSA will review nominations to see that they are consistent with
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state energy policy and needs assessment.
4. The EFSA will certify through its own review process the capacity
of the project nominator to implement the proposed project after
evaluating its fiscal and technological soundness.
5. The EFSA will extract a performance bond based on percentage
of the project's projected capital cost to guarantee "good faith"
negotiation with local communities during subsequent phases of the
energy facility siting process.
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Section 8. Request for Site Proposal (RFSP)
After a developer has submitted a project nomination, the EFSA must develop
and distribute a Request for Site Proposal to all local governments within
the service region (applicable only to the area within the state and not
extra-state service area) proposed by the developer. The RFSP must describe
the general facility design and desirable physical site requirements, must
include a site nomination form and compliance checklist (meeting state and
federal requirements) to be completed by the local community.
To ensure that all potential sites are considered for evaluation by EFSA,
sites are nominated by communities in the following fashion:
1. EFSA will develop and distribute an information package based on
information obtained through the project nomination process to all
local governments within the propos d service district (region).
2. EFSA must include in the information package data from all other
state and federal regulatory agencies that relate to facility con-
struction and operation.
3. The information package must contain:
(a) a rough, preliminary architectural facility design (to be pro-
vided by the project nominator);
(b) minimum physical site requirements (to be provided by the pro-
ject nominator);
(c) a site nomination form, to be developed by EFSA and completed
by a local community, which describes the physical and legal
constraints binding the land parcel which the community wishes
to nominate. The form must include a section detailing the
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process of site solicitations within the local community;
(d) a compliance checklist which identifies all state and federal
requirements-that preclude development. Every state and fed-
eral regulatory agency must approve the compliance checklist
before it becomes part of the information package.
4. The site nominator must be the local government(s) in which the land
parcel is located. The local government must publicize, within two
weeks of receipt of the RFSP, its search for sites within the juris-
diction. Individually-owned, as well as corporate and public tracts,
must be considered by the locality.
5. EFSA shall evaluate RFSPs in the light of the site nominator's ful-
fillment of site requirements and its ability to meet the confor-
mance checklist.
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Section 9. Site Nomination
Once the local jurisdictions receive the RFSP, they may nominate a site(s)
within the jurisdiction which they believe complies with the site require-
ments listed in the RFSP and resubmit the site nomination form and compli-
ance checklist (both part of the RFSP package) to the EFSA. In addition,
the site nominator (local jurisdiction) must submit to the EFSA a descrip-
tion of the ownership(s) of the site, local zoning ordinances, existing
infrastructure, potential mitigating measures that might minimize environ-
mental dangers and adverse impacts.
To allow for the selection and evaluation of specific locations on which
approved projects can be sited:
1. Sites may be nominated by the chief officer of the local jurisdic-
tions (municipality or, in case of unincorporated land, the county)
or, in the case of any site for which there is no local jurisdiction,
by the chief officer of the state or federal agency with jurisdic-
tion over that parcel.
2. Financing of the site nomination process will be provided by site
nominator.
3. Upon request, EFSA will provide technical assistance to local juris-
dictions to help them prepare their nomination packages.
4. In partial compliance with Section 6, to assess citizen reaction to
the proposed site, at least two public hearings will be conducted in
the local community making the nomination.
5. The EFSA will develop a questionnaire which the local government
shall circulate to assess citizen reaction to the proposed facility.
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The questionnaire will elicit attitudes towards use of the proposed
site, as well as perceived social and economic impacts. This ques-
tionnaire will have only a non-binding informational role; it will
not serve the function of a referendum.
(a) all registered voters and property owners within miles of
the proposed site, regardless of whether they are located within
the jurisdiction, will receive a questionnaire.
6. The local government must complete the site nomination form.
(a) if the site straddles more than one locality, then all localities
involved must join as site nominators.
(b) if the site is located in one municipality, but its environmental
impact area overlaps other jurisdictions as determined by EFSA
in the review of the RSFP form, then the nomination will be re-
jected, unless other jurisdicti~n(s) are co-nominators.
(c) in nominating a site not actually owned by site nominator, writ-
ten agreement of the owner(s) is a necessary part of the appli-
cation unless intention to take land by eminent domain is clear-
ly stated.
7. The local government must indicate whether the site is in confor-
mance with state and federal regulations included in the RFSP com-
pliance checklist. If the site does not comply with all state and
federal laws and regulations, the site nominator must justify its
request for specific exceptions.
8. The local government must also submit to EFSA transcripts of all
public hearings conducted within the community, an analysis of the
results of the questionnaires, copies of media announcements, and a
54
sampling of "pro" and "con" letters to the editor if such exist.
9. The local government shall submit an application fee of
to EFSA with the site nomination.
10. The site nominator's response to EFSA's RFSP must also include:
(a) description of ownership of the site(s) as well as an assess-
ment of problems involved in assembling the various parcels;
(b) maps describing present uses of the site as well as population
distribution within a proximal area to the site dependent on
the technology and specified in the RFSP;
(c) applicable local zoning and local ordinances;
(d) availability of suitable pipeline/power grid connections be-
tween the site and the existing distribution network;
(e) an explanation of the potential mitigating measures that might
be needed to minimize environmental dangers and adverse social
impacts;
(f) a budget for conducting the necessary investigations to pre-
pare a focused environmental impact assessment of the site.
The impact statement would be made by the site nominator with
technical assistance from EFSA (see Section 11).
11. EFSA shall include with its announcement of the RFSP closing dates
for receipt of site nominations.
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Section 10. Environmental Impact Report (EIR) Preparation
This section elaborates the requirement of an Environmental Impact Report
(EIR) for each site which must be prepared for the technical screening
phase. The EIR is to speZZ out short- and long-term environmental effects
in cost-benefit terms, both state-wide and locally, so that residents of
the affected areas can use the EIR in constructing bids for mitigation
measures and compensation.
An Environmental Impact Report (EIR) must be conducted for every nominated
site in compliance with the State Environmental Quality Act (SEPA). To en-
sure the assessment of the environmental impacts of each site/technology
combination:
1. EFSA will submit to the state legislature a proposed total budget
for conducting the EIRs necessary for each site proposal.
2. EFSA, jointly with each local jurisdiction which nominates a site,
shall negotiate a contract with an EIR consultant.
3. The EIR must identify any adverse environmental effect which cannot
be avoided should the proposal be implemented.
4. The EIR must assess the short-term and long-term environmental
costs and benefits with particular reference to impact upon renew-
able versus exhaustible resources.
5. The purpose of the EIR process is to inform the local jurisdiction,
its surrounding areas, and all other interested parties of the ex-
tent of the potential impacts. The EIR must be prepared and pre-
sented in a clear and succinct manner so that it can be useful to
the site negotiator in constructing a bid for mitigation measures
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and compensation within the framework of the mediation council
(see Section 12).
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Section 11. Technical Assessment of Sites
AZ nominated sites must undergo a technical screening conducted by the
EFSA staff and circulated for review and comment to governmental agencies
with interests in the project. Results of the analyses and acceptance or
rejection of the sites will be conveyed to both site and project nomina-
tors.
The technical screening of all nominated sites is a prerequisite in as-
sessing nominations for technical acceptability:
1. EFSA staff will conduct the technical screening of each site nomina-
tion to ensure that each site meets existing state and federal regu-
lations.
2. Evaluation must be according to a standardized method.
3. Nominations must meet minimum site feasibility constraints estab-
lished in the RSFP information package, or site nominator must jus-
tify its request for specific exceptions.
4. EFSA conducts in-depth evaluation of each nomination and prepares
preliminary report which includes a hearing in which site and project
nominators take part. Final report designates sites which pass tech-
nical screening. Report includes statement of environmental advan-
tages and disadvantages and describes facility design conditions and
other measures necessary to ameliorate adverse effects.
5. If no site passes the technical screening, EFSA will inform project
nominator that an alternative energy technology must be used, which
would require a new project nomination.
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This section establishes a mediation council consisting of three permanent
members: the project nominator, an EPSA staff member, and an independent
mediator appointed by the Governor of the state; and an ad hoc member for
every given site: the site nominator. The council's purpose is to bring
together the parties directly involved in the siting of a particular facil-
ity and give the site nominator(s) (the locality(ies) desiring the siting
of the proposed facility within its jurisdiction) an opportunitj to "bid"
for the right to locate the facility on land within its boundaries. The
bidding consists of each site nominator, in consonance with the rest of
the council, developing a package that includes the levels of compensation
which the community expects for itself and individuals living within a spe-
cified geographical impact area.
To ensure that the siting of an energy facility in the state is both equi-
table and efficient, and that compensation is distributed in an equitable
and timely manner:
1. A mediation council shall be established and shall consist of three
permanent members: the project nominator, a professional staff mem-
ber from EFSA and an independent mediator: the project nominator;
a professional staff member from EFSA and an independent mediator
to be appointed by the Governor of the state who must receive unan-
imous approval from the other members of the council; and, an ad hoc
member for every given site; the site nominator.
*
The bid package is then presented to the voters of the jurisdiction
(s) in a nonbinding referendum. The results of this referendum might influ-
ence the decision of the local government on bid submission and could have
an impact on the decision of the developer to continue. The bid will also
include those measures which the community expects to take to attract the
project. The project nominator then decides upon the desired site - suppo-
sedly that site which requires the least amount of compensation to be paid
by the developer.
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2. The representative of the site nominator must have the authority
to act on behalf of the local governmental authority.
3. The mediation council must determine the boundaries of the geo-
graphical impact areas within which residents or workers would
receive compensation for each site under construction.
4. The mediation council shall specify the changes in the facility
needed to mitigate its impact on the community and the individuals
within the geographical impact area.
5. The mediation council shall negotiate an offer of two types of com-
pensation. These compensations will be paid by the project nomi-
nator to the successful site nominator.
(a) compensation for public service costs incurred during con-
struction of the facility shall be determined by the mediation
council in consultation with the appropriate governmental
agency within each site nominator's jurisdiction. Upon com-
pletion of the facility, the negotiated public service com-
pensation shall be paid through property taxes.
(b) an amount and form of compensation for social and environmen-
tal costs incurred by the facility shall be paid both to those
individuals who will be negatively affected and to the commun-
ity-at-large. Monetary and in-kind payment, and mitigatory
measures must all be considered as possible forms of compensa-
tion.
6. The mediation council shall negotiate, for each nominated site,
an insurance bond; the bond shall be used to pay persons owning
property at the time of announcement of facility for any decrease
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in property value directly caused by the facility within five
years of its completion. The EFSA shall determine the decrease by
comparing prevailing housing market values to the general consumer
price index for housing in the states.
7. The performance bond, submitted by the project nominator and the
application fee submitted by site nominators shall be held in an
EFSA trust until one site has been selected. The application fees
shall then be returned to all unsuccessful site nominators.
8. The mediation council shall decide on a time schedule for the con-
struction of the facility. The council shall also decide on a time
schedule for compensation payments in accordance with the facility's
construction and operation schedules.
9. If, in the opinion of the mediator, delays in construction sche-
dules or compensation payments are deliberate on the part of either
project or site nominator, the med ator shall demand payment of a
fine; the fine shall be the amount of the performance bond for the
project nominator and the application fee in the case where fault
lies with the site nominator.
10. In the case where fines are incurred, they shall be placed in an
EFSA fund which shall be used to defray future costs of energy
facility siting and as grants to future site nominators.
11. With completion of facility, the application fee shall be returned
with interest to the site nominator. The performance bond shall
be returned to the project nominator only after all compensation
has been made.
12. The mediation council shall develop a bid package for each nomina-
ting jurisdiction, consisting of the comprehensive list of stipu-
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lations that a jurisdiction will require in exchange for its ac-
cepting the proposed project at the level of impacts indicated in
the project nomination and the EIR. These stipulations may include
mitigation, acceptable levels of compensation, property taxation
formulae, safety and health standards, and protection against future
facility changes. The bid package shall also detail the concessions
offered the project nominator by the local jurisdiction, such as
zoning variances, guarantees against property tax escalation, etc.
13. A formal public report to all site nominators shall summarize the
contents of all packages, providing the residents with the oppor-
tunity to compare the various bids prior to the holding of nonbind-
ing referenda.
14. The bid package must be presented to the voters of the jurisdic-
tion(s) in a nonbinding referendum.
15. The local government having jurisdiction over the site shall either
ratify the bid package, propose a counter-bid to the mediation
council, or withdraw nomination, following the nonbinding referen-
dum.
16. A counter-bid by the site nominator shall be dcalt with via the
mediation council's established negotiation process.
17. The project nominator shall assess all ratified bids and either ac-
cept one or propose a subsequent round of counter-offers to all
site nominators.
18. All counter-offers resulting in new bids shall be ratified by the
local government having jurisdiction over the site. This ratifica-
tion shall include submission of the bid package to the voters of
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the jurisdiction in a nonbinding referendum (cf. #15).
20. The project nominator shall select a site and meet the final bid
of the local jurisdiction.
21. The project nominator may request state aid to meet a bid. This
request would be submitted to EFSA. Should EFSA approve the re-
quest, EFSA shall submit its recommendation to the state legisla-
ture. The state legislature may then either allocate public re-
sources to be added to the bid or deny them. .
22. In the event that the project nominator cannot meet the bid and the
legislature chooses not to allocate public resources for this pur-
pose, no site shall be selected and the project shall not be built.
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Section 13. Commitments
Agreements between project nominator and site nominator are necessary for
licenses to be issued by EFSA. A performance bond and an application fee
are elicited from the project nominator and site nominator, respectively,
to ensure good faith bargaining.
In order to facilitate successful energy sitings:
1. Agreements between project nominator and site nominator are neces-
sary prior to issuance of construction and operation licenses by
EFSA to project nominator.
2. EFSA shall hold the performance bond to ensure good faith bargain-
ing by the project nominator and compliance with the stated level
of compensation and impact mitigation measures.
3. EFSA shall hold the application fet to ensure good faith bargaining
by the site nominator.
4. Willful violation of the agreement, as determined by the indepen-
dent mediator, shall be considered a gross misdemeanor and be brought
by the EFSA to the attorney general for court action.
5. For each day that the construction or operation of the facility is
willfully delayed, the court may assess civil penalties in an
amount of .
64
Section 14. Special Report to the Legislature
Periodic Special Reports to the Legislature regarding the future location
of energy facilities within the state will serve as both an evaluation of
the current situation and as the basis for future nominations.
Every fifth year a Special Report on the future location of energy facili-
ties within the state must be submitted to the legislature and is to in-
clude:
1. A discussion of factors that have been found in reviewing proposals
for development which have impeded the identification or develop-
ment of potentially desirable sites.
2. A description of the means by which inequities among successful
site nomination bid packages are to be corrected.
3. A discussion of the relationship between siting and other aspects
of energy facility planning, including transmission line site and
capacity planning.
4. A discussion of the advantages and limitations of the technical
screening and EIR processes, and a description of the steps neces-
sary to ensure their proper use.
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CHAPTER THREE
Conclusion: Strengths and Weaknesses of Proposed Legislation
The heart of this legislation is a negotiation/compensation process
that recognizes political realities. The legislation puts forward an in-
centive scheme which promotes consensus. The no-build option is retained
by communities, thus acknowledging the situations in which community oppo-
sition to a facility is overriding. This differs markedly from arbitra-
tion which imposes solutions. Neither scheme eliminates subsequent ap-
peals through the courts.
Chapter One dealt with the generic issues and subissues of energy
facility siting. Chapter Two incorporated suggested solutions to these
issues into the proposed legislation. What follows is a systematic and
summary analysis of the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the legis-
lation.
This legislation mandates a reorganization of regulatory authority
and a balancing of public versus private responsibilities through a sys-
tem of negotiation and compensation.
The present multiplicity of regulatory agencies results in a frag-
mented review of energy facility proposals where many agencies look at a
single alternative in a narrow way.
As the sole regulatory agency, the EFSA should have a sufficiently
borad perspective to encompass a much wider variety of technologies and
site alternatives than any single agency concerned with one part of the
issue. EFSA would have the ability to consider relevant tradeoffs which
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at present escape the review of the separate agencies.
A provision for Governing Board members with knowledge and/or ex-
perience relating narrowly to energy systems or more broadly to land use
problems, is intended to ensure that the decision-making body can command
a high level of public confidence and respect.
Since terms of EFSA Board members are coterminous with that of the
Governor, the possibility exists that continuity of service and experience
may be interrupted. However, this gives EFSA greater leverage with the
Governor and the legislature.
With the EFSA as lead agency, energy policy is tied to both needs
assessment and project nomination. In a coordinated action, EFSA will
solicit input from the other state and federal agencies, and from the
utlilities. The role of EFSA in directing technology screening and site
selection should inspire public confidence because the process is not
left in the hands of the utilities.
The EIR/EIS is conducted before sites have been selected and land
aquired by the applicant. With this balancing of public and private
responsibility, review of alternatives is no longer limited to construc-
tion issues, but includes measures aimed at distributing benefits broadly,
and achieving equity through compensation. In addition, nominations for
sites which do not meet all technical criteria may include an explanation
as to why a site is nevertheless desirable. This enables greater flexibil-
ity in future stages of the process: more options are kept alive longer.
The legislation mandates that any impacts which a particular interest
group thinks are important be included in EFSA's analysis. EFSA holds pub-
lic-hearings at the beginning of both the technology and site selection
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processes, not, as is currently the case, only after a project and site
has tentatively been approved. The site nomination section of the legis-
lation creates opportunities for much broader participation (i.e., question-
naires, hearings, nonbinding referenda).
The agency post of ombudsman is designed to increase public confi-
dence in the decision process, and to provide a mechanism for including
minority views, both local and geographically diffuse, in the selection
of both technology and site.
The most effective vehicle which this legislation offers for in-
creased participation, however, is compensation for individuals and com-
munities through negotiation.
Negotiation is the medium used for including individual and commun-
ity estimates of social costs. This, in turn, enables developers to anti-
cipate the degree of resistance to energy development and induce the de-
velopers to choose preferable sites. The greatest degree of participa-
tion can be expected when an individual has something to gain personally
from participating in the process.
Negotiations occur within the framework of the mediation council.
The council cannot impose a solution. Under certain conditions, there
is widespread opposition to a facility and the facility should not be
built. The legislation proposes an incentive scheme. The scheme is based
on consensus and aims to minimize individual challenges in courts. If the
council or the EFSA were to impose a solution when parties do not agree,
the plant would be sited by default. This is not effective because such
an imposition could eventually be challenged in the courts by individuals.
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There would be less faith in the process of compensation through negoti-
ation. Although the process of bids and one-round of counter-bids is
time-consuming, it may avoid lawsuits which could stretch out for years,
and with ultimate cost to the consumer. Thus, by lengthening the review
and negotiation process, construction time is likely to be shortened.
The compensation agreement tiespayments to various stages of the
facility's construction, to try to limit a community's opposition which
may arise after the agreement has been made and the company too far com-
mitted to back out easily. By reducing alienation and trying to avoid
drawn-out legal battles, this legislation trys to combine the objectives
of securing adequate energy supplies and safeguarding environmental values.
We feel that this legislation provides a legal process to achieve
the efficient and equitable siting of energy facilities in tune with our
present social environment. Clearly, some of the specific details of the
Act have been arrived at arbitrarily. Also, in certain instances the
legislation has been left purposefully vague in order to provide some lee-
way in its implementation. The following is offered as both summary and
explanation for salient questions that may arise from a reading of the Act.
Needs Assessment and Energy Policy
Although the legislation emphasizes consideration of a wide range
of technologies and forecasting methods, no strategy is prescribed for
ranking preferred technologies. Also, some aspects of the needs assess-
ment are tentative and some technologies are untested and hard to analyze.
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The different technologies must be assessed in terms of different time
frames, making the process more complex, and no strategy is prescribed
for meshing the results of various forecasting techniques. The intergov-
ernmental coordination strategy required in EFSA's development of needs
assessment is not fully designed.
Financing
The EIR is financed by the state. The scope of the EIR is deter-
mined by how much each community spends and, with each community spending
the same amount, the EIRs are more standardized. Poorer communities have
an equal chance at nominating sites. In the case where there are many
site applications, however, the state may provide less funds per EIR, and
the result may be poorer quality EIRs. The legislation does not allow
communities to supplement the cost of EIRs since inequalities among site
nominators are not encouraged.
The site nomination process is financed by elite nominators (local-
ity[ies]), as part of the gamble that the community takes by entering a
bid and as a measure of its initial interest. The disadvantages are that
poorer communities may not have an equal chance, although they may want
the plant more than others. The cost may discourage communities from
entering a bid and fewer sites may be nominated. If, however, the entire
process were to be financed by the developer, the number of sites for each
project would be limited in the interests of cost savings. Thus the bid
process would become less competitive.
Participation
The measures to increase the opportunities for participation are
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admittedly not problem-free. There exist logistical problems of distri-
buting, collecting, tabulating and analyzing a large number of question-
naires. Moreover, the questionnaire results and nonbinding referenda
may be viewed by many people as having little consequence because they
lack legal weight. No citizen participation techniques other than public
hearings are specified. Attempts to coalesce diffuse interests through
the public hearing process may reach only the most articulate or best-
financed groups. In addition, public hearings do not afford such oppor-
tunity for group learning through dialogue, cross-examinationct&-
Site Nomination
In the legislative scheme, individuals cannot be site nominators.
The advantage is that since individuals have to go through the community,
there is a greater guarantee that the site request, if approved, will be
more acceptable within the community. While this could have the effect
of reducing the number of sites to be reviewed; it is likely that most
individuals proposing viable sites could find the appropriate sponsor-
ship.
Technical Assessment
To expedite matters, existing state and federal regulations are
used as basic screening criteria. This could result in overregulation.
Nominations for sites which do not meet all technical criteria may include
an explanation as to why the site is nevertheless desirable. Such excep-
tions are permitted to provide greater flexibility in future stages of
the process by keeping alive a larger number of options.
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However, no strategy is prescribed for verifying, in advance, the
safety of those sites which do not meet all screening criteria, and yet
continue to be considered. The legislation may thus allow some sites to
be considered that might be found faulty only towards the very end of the
process, in return for greater initial flexibility.
Mediation Council
Although negotiation is mandated in the legislation, certain aspects
of the process have been left open.
The legislation does not define standardized geographical impact
areas. This presents a problem but legislating standardized boundaries
presented even greater problems because geographical boundaries are
abritrary and unreal. The lack of more specific guidelines for drawing
geographical impact boundaries may provide opportunity for major political
conflict on that issue alone.
Within the framework of the mediation council, local government,
most familiar with local problems, has the opportunity to deal directly
with the siting issues. Localities may, however., lack a-clear mechanism
for involving local citizens in agreeing on mitigation measures and ap-
propriate compensation.
In addition, there is a possibility of legal problems if very diver-
gent claims for compensation are made by similarly situated landowners.
By compensating individuals and communities for negative impacts
of energy facilities, we bring these costs into the cost/benefit calcula-
tions and thereby (1) present a truer picture of the project's impacts
on society, and (2) force the developer to respond fully. However, a pre-
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cedent is established for public compensation in environmental matters
which could be very costly if expanded to other areas.
In enacting legislation, legislators must try to respond to public
need in ways that are both cost-efficient and socially beneficial. The
energy crisis requires that our law-makers take bold and unprecedented
initiative. We believe that the negotiation-compensation system proposed
is an innovative process, that is a logical alternative to a system that
is now not working well, and that it provides legislators the opportunity
to offer the public a politically-popular mechanism based on consensus.
The Act presents the prospect for breaking the current log-jam, in which
new facilities are being developed with increasing infrequency and at
greater costs. On the other hand, the Act avoids the alternative of
governmental action fiat.
There is no ironclad guarantee for the success of the proposed legis-
lation. However, the process of compensation through negotiation that has
as its objective a consensually-based solution is in keeping with current
political and social philosophical trends. It therefore offers prospects
for success and deserves serious consideration.
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